(15 November, 2015)

Who was upset after November 1 and why?

The optimistic and starry-eyed atmosphere in the aftermath of the June 7 elections seems to have been be replaced by  pessimism today. The rise of AKP’s votes to 49%, which enabled them to form a government alone, and the fall of HDP’s votes to 10.7% with 59 MPs, have been regarded as a victory for AKP and a defeat for HDP and its supporters. Thus, even before the morning of November 2, analyses addressing the reasons behind HDP’s failure were released, placing the blame squarely on PKK and YDG-H. The worn-out analyses aimed at understanding the “sociology” behind AKP were rehashed. No doubt, , statements like “No room for despair. We will continue our struggle!” were declared to counter these know-it-alls who popped up as an exemplary case of the idiom, “it’s easy to be wise after the event”. However, declarations of determination could not go beyond restoring faith as they did not address the actual possibilities and opportunities, nor did they draw attention to the tasks awaiting the left. In fact, because of their abstract tone, they were regarded as commonplace pro forma words and became further agents of pessimism.

In comparison to the results of the June 7 elections, the results of the November 1 elections clearly indicate a relapse in the balance of forces.  It is, nonetheless, not accurate to describe it as a victory of AKP and a defeat for HDP and its supporters because the very results of November 1 actually indicate success for HDP in comparison to the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections, and even to the circumstances prior to June 7. However, according to yet another common perspective and project in the left, the previous elections are indicators of failed plans, even another rout. The pessimistic atmosphere created by the November 1 elections is mainly related to this rout. For this reason, it is necessary to speak of which perspective was routed on November 1 in order to appreciate the significance of the opportunities and the insubstantiality of pessimism.

What was routed on November 1 was the parliamentarian dream, the legalistic dream. The June 7elections, the boom in HDP votes and the fall of AKP votes beyond expectations, were factors that helped the dissemination of such parliamentarian fantasies in the left. According to this view, Erdoğan had resorted to violence as prospects of defeat became clearer to him, and in the face of HDP’s calls for peace and compromise, he increased the dose of violence and cut his own throat. As long as HDP walks on the road of peace and compromise, AKP would lose votes, HDP would gain strength, and the weakened AKP would have to form a coalition government with CHP. This coalition government between AKP and CHP would further isolate and Erdoğan, forcing him to be more passive. This scenario, including the division of AKP, aimed to get rid of Erdoğan through parliamentarian means and then make a constitution based on “public accord,” actually referred to a coalition of CHP, HDP, and Gül’s supporters in AKP. Yet, the results of the November 1 elections ruined all these plans. This rout lies at the core of the prevalent pessimism in the left today.

The Real Surprise was on June 7, not on November 1

As a matter of fact, the real surprise was the results of the June 7 elections, not of November 1. For the June 7 elections, expectations were in favour of HDP passing the threshold by a whisker. This was forgotten when the balances in the bourgeois political realm carried HDP’s votes over 13%, and its passing the threshold by a whisker on November 1 was  regarded as a regression. In actual fact, the perception that HDP would naturally and expectedly receive 13% of the votes, was wrong, and thereby a handicap (along with the state’s attacks and manipulations) to cogent endeavors that were pivotal for an efficient electoral campaign in November. For this reason, the risk of staying under the threshold was as high as expected before the June 7 elections.

Furthermore, those who think and argue that HDP’s June 7 success was a result of its decision to stay within legal bounds and parliamentary political channels, recommended the same pacifist and moderate attitude for November. They believed this attitude would spell a rout for HDP and its supporters.

Nevertheless, for non-parliamentarian politics, there is no reason to talk about a defeat, let alone a rout. This is because there is actually no real difference between 60 or 80 MPs for a non-parliamentarian movement that does not hope to increase its number of seats in the coalition. HDP’s current existence in the parliament is sufficient to bring together the streets and the parliament, and to use the parliament as leverage in order to build a mass mobilization of labourers. The recent developments have neither alleviated the regime crisis, nor have they changed the balance of power in favour of Erdoğan. On the contrary, HDP is in a much more advantageous position compared to the period prior to June 7.

Guerillaism, as much as parliamentarianism, is misleading for an evaluation of the November 1 elections

On the other hand, it is not only the clouds of legalistic, parliamentarian dreams that are an obstacle to perceiving the advantages of the current situation. The views based on guerillaist, military battle strategies are blocking the perception of the political picture that is the consequence of the November 1 elections. After all, behind the drift to legalistic parliamentarianism lies the comprehension of those who consider battle strategies that are a closed path. Oscillations between the two poles of opportunism are a familiar phenomenon. In the same vein, after the rout of the legalist parliamentarian dreams, there will be those voicing the need to re-escalate the guerrilla war. They will say that the main mistake was to leave the guerrilla path. The principal underlying reason for this vicious cycle is the inability to embrace a proletarian revolutionist strategy. Unless the path pointed out by the Bolsheviks is embraced, it is impossible to diagnose HDP’s main flaw and to identify the appropriate strategy that should have been taken from June 7 to November 1 to derogate the AKP. For the same reason, the illusion of AKP’s victory in an election hindered by all the pressure and ideological state apparatuses would be the prevailing discourse that would reinforce the consequent pessimism.

What those  oscillating between fighting against AKP at the elections and embracing guerrillaist strategies cannot see is the fact that the true path to derogating the AKP and paving the way for a democratic struggle is to build a mass, joint mobilization of the labourers and the oppressed. Both parliamentarian opportunities and armed struggle can be efficient methods as long as they serve this purpose, as its strategic means. This is Bolshevik Revolution 101. Unless these lessons are learned and applied, it is not possible to benefit from the opportunities offered by the current situation in accordance with the struggle for democratic rights.

KöZ has been stating that AKP has been in regression since the 2009 local elections. Since the Gezi Revolt,  KöZ has underlined that we were in a regime crisis. The results of the November 1 elections haven’t contradicted any of these interpretations. November 1 has neither reversed AKP’s regression, nor has it alleviated the regime crisis.

AKP is in Regression

Let’s start with AKP’s regression. This is not comprehensible as per the parliamentarian mentality that is highly common in the left. This is because those who see the parliament as an organ where the public will is manifested, instead of an element of bourgeois state apparatus, also believe that the power of the parties is correlated with their number of votes. In this line, if a party’s votes are increasing, then this indicates that people are favouring this party and it is getting stronger. Vice versa, if a party is losing votes, it indicates the weakening of that party. Frankly, once this perspective is embraced, it is almost impossible to conduct a long and medium term analysis of politics in Turkey. According to this view, AKP was weakened first in 2009 by getting votes under 40%, re-gained strength in the following referendum by reaching 60%, reinforced this strength in the 2011 elections by setting a votes record, but was weakened by 3-4 points in the 2014 elections, and in response, gained strength again after five months in the presidential elections. In the June 7 elections following these dizzying zigzags, AKP had suddenly declined, but after five months, it hit the peak of its power with a new record number of votes. Once such nonsense is sold as political analysis, it is as easy as pie to talk about the messages given by the almighty and all-seeing rational voters that are independent of time, location, and power balance. It is not surprising that the bourgeois ideology has fetishized “voters” and the “national will” to make analyses like “what message did the voters give this time?” What is most alarming is the embrace of this perception by those who claim to fight for the oppressed. The latest example of this is the statement of the HDP co-chairs as “We respect the election results” on the night of November 1. As long as this perception prevails, it is of course not possible to see the AKP’s regression.

The parliament is one of the apparatuses of the bourgeois state and just like the efforts of  bourgeois parties to settle their cadres in the bureaucracy, they contest elections not to increase their votes, but their weight in the parliament. The same is true for local elections. Therefore, while evaluating the results of elections since 2009, the first issue to consider is the weight of AKP in the parliament and in the municipalities. In these sections of the state apparatus, despite the fluctuations of votes in the elections, there has clearly been a steady regression in both these sections. In the 2014 local elections, AKP fell behind the 2009 figures, particularly in Kurdistan. Their number of MPs declined both in the 2011 and the 2015 elections. The surprise regression in the June 7 elections has offered exceptional opportunities for the movement of the labourers and the oppressed; these could not be used and were thereby missed. However, the loss of these exceptional opportunities of June 7 should not overshadow the general regression of AKP that was also displayed in the elections.

Nevertheless, the diagnosis of KöZ on AKP’s regression was neither deduced from, nor based on, the election results. It was mainly expressing that the AKP, as a leader of executive power, or in other words a leader of the redesign of Turkey’s politics via the regression of the army, an operation whose framework was set by the US, would lose its hegemony in the state and would not be able to carry out the plans and projects on its agenda as smoothly as before. Since then, the operation attempt against Hakan Fidan, the way that Ergenekon lawsuits were handled, the tapes spread around the time after 17-25 December have all been confirmations of this regression. Despite all of Eroğan’s operations targeting parallel organizations, which tore the bureaucracy to shreds, the November 1 elections haven’t changed the picture. From the decision of the Supreme Board of Elections (YSK) on the transportation of votes, to the reluctance of the Armed Forces to conduct military operations in Kurdistan are all symptoms that AKP’s executive power has not increased, but declined. Developments in this direction will continue after November 1.

More importantly, since 2009, it has become difficult to talk about a unitary AKP, and even more so since 2014 as it has turned into a fractionised party. The performances of Bülent Arınç and Abdullah Gül in the last six months point to a rise in such efforts. Even though the election results strengthen the hands of those advocating unconditional submission to Erdoğan, an increase in centrifugal inclinations is the general course of affairs. Moreover, the achievement of a success that was unexpected even for AKP itself will add to the tensions between Davutoğlu and Erdoğan.

The crisis of the September 12 regime has not eased

However, AKP’s regression should not be the only point of focus. It is not possible to fully grasp the political picture without taking into account the regime crisis we are passing through. Under regular circumstances when there is no regime crisis, bourgeois parties are of course expected to gain or lose strength within the regime via its usual channels. The rise and fall of Özal and his ANAP from the 1980’s to the mid 1990’s is a typical example of this. Likewise, even though the on-and-off coalitions that went on through the 1990’s might indicate a mild political crisis, since there was no regime crisis, what was really happening was a process in which bourgeois parties were going up and down in turns. Since  the Armed Forces, the main pillar of the September 12 regime, were in control of the situation during the entire process with all their organs and especially the regime’s neural system, the presidency, none of these developments were causing permanent damage to the functioning of the state. Within this framework, the overthrow of the Erbakan-Çiller coalition government in the February 28 process should be regarded as part of the regime’s usual functioning.

Nonetheless, right after February 28, especially after Öcalan being taken as a hostage, the efforts of the US to make Turkey’s political system suitable for EU membership by downgrading the army have weakened the role of the Armed Forces in the regime, so the September 12 regime hasgradually approached a crisis. The struggle of the Kurds who refused to wear the straitjacket of September 12 has grown out of control,wearing out the regime and exposing its cracks. After the military’s marginalization then, competition among all other actors of the regime sharpened inevitably, and political life came to be dominated by promises of change, especially constitutional amendments. By their very nature, however, all the actors that are products of the September 12 regime can neither change the regime nor push each other out of the political stage for good in this crisis. The same can be said for the US, which has used parliamentary channels to place AKP in rits desired position on the political stage so far.

This is  exactly why it is one thing to talk about AKP’s regression and another thing to argue that this regression will enable anti-Erdoğan groups to get rid of Erdoğan and AKP through the regular functioning of the September 12 regime. Those who calculate the elimination of AKP and Erdoğan through parliamentarian means approach AKP’s regression without taking the current regime crisis into account. On the contrary, what deepens the current regime crisis the most is Erdoğan’s opponents’ inability to get rid of him despite all the monkey business. Neither can Erdoğan  get rid of his opponents by sticking to the rules of the regimeHis efforts to change the September 12 regime in favour of a presidential system within the given framework, so as to save himself, have all ended in frustration. All these frustrating efforts to either get rid of Erdoğan and AKP, or to convert to the presidential system, do not diminish the competition between the parties or further weaken the pillars of the regime. In other words, due to the regime crisis that is owed to the exclusion of the Armed Forces (TSK),  the AKP cannot be liquidated via the tools of the regime, despite its regression. And the non-liquidation of AKP and Erdoğan intensifies the regime crisis. Moreover, Erdoğan has to suppress the Kurdish movement in order to survive, and as long as he leans on TSK for this purpose, further intensification of the crisis is inevitable.

November 1 elections haven’t changed this picture either. Following the 2011 elections, KöZ maintained that the tension between Erdoğan’s increasing votes vis-à-vis the declining number of seats in the parliament would bring the issues of presidency and constitutional amendments into focus. The November 1 elections have produced a similar result by further decreasing the number of AKP seats in the parliament. The statement from Beştepe (the palace) as “there can be a referendum” three days after the elections is a signal that Erdoğan would insist on the same attitude, but from a more disadvantageous position than in 2011, further escalating the dynamics of the crisis.

AKP faces the most severe problems in its history

In evaluating November 1 and its aftermath, it would be misleading to see only the AKP’s regression and the regime crisis. Due to its surprising results, the June 7 election hindered an appreciation of the magnitude of problems awaiting the new government. However, after November 1, the government will be serving under the most disadvantageous circumstances since 2002.

At the top of the list of problems are Syria and Kurdistan. In a phase when America and Russia agreed on a solution including Assed and both increased co-operation with YPG, the government would be offside if it bases its Syria policy on praying in the Emevi Mosque and barking at YPG. Insistence on this position will nonetheless increase international pressure on Turkey. Similarly, in the upcoming period, the government will receive the response to its cunningness of intentionally facilitating the passage of Syrian refugees to Europe.

Unable to intervene in the developments in Rojava, the government has also lost the chance to  subjugate the part of Kurdistan within Turkey’s borders with consent, and started to rely mainly on arms to maintain its sovereignty. As a result, its chances of controlling the resistance in Kurdistan are dwindling steadily. Actually, by taking the initiative to increase state terror in Kurdistan during the election process, the AKP government was hoping to get under control the dynamics its own violence had created in the aftermath of November 1. So, on November 2, they were hoping to say “the coalition threat is over, so is the bloodshed”. However, as demonstrated by the attempts to cover the trenches after the elections, it would not be possible to stop the resistance of Kurds whenever AKP wants.

After all, there is an economic side to the issue. The general tendency for stagnation in the world-economy, as a result of which the principal body of capital coming from imperialist metropoles remained in Turkey, was in the form of factors that have been strengthening Erdoğan’s hand so far. The recession in private sector investments as a result of the same stagnation, forces Erdoğan to extend the public sector for the sake of his populist policies, in other words, to have a budget deficit and to run into debt. However, until today, Erdoğan’s main trump was the lightness of the state’s debt burden. Yet, promises like “minimum wage will be 1300 TL”, “cadres for the subcontracted labourers”, “salary reinforcement for the retired”, “dowry assistance for the newlyweds”, “the nullity of the general health insurance debts”, cannot be explained only with the Keynesian precautions vis-à-vis the global economic stagnation. The more important dimension of the issue is related to AKP’s regression. The AKP of Erdoğan, who until yesterday spoke to his voters in a tone of “To hell with your mother”, had to give excessive bribes to voters so as to increase its votes. In the upcoming period, AKP will not only have to deal with the burden of these promises on the budget, but it will also have to absorb the anger of the people who believed these bribery promises.

The opportunities of HDP have multiplied

On the other side of the fence, in comparison to the 2011 elections, the opportunities of HDP have multiplied. Not only has their number of seats increased by 70%, but they have also become the third party in the parliament and have been entitled to a parliamentary deputy speaker position. Although the opportunity to paralyze the parliament provided by the June 7 election was missed, this is still a much stronger position than the one after the 2011 elections.

Despite the relative decrease in votes in comparison to the boom of votes on June 7, HDP’s current votes are a significant success not only compared to the 2011 elections, but also to the presidential elections which were also regarded as a huge success. Compared to a year ago, HDP’s votes have increased by 30%. Moreover, the gains in Turkey’s western regions have been retained, including the cities that had never voted for HDP before. Besides, all these gains were achieved despite the fact that HDP canceled its rallies and hardly carried out any election campaign until November 1.

In the aftermath of the November 1 elections then, while AKP was in regression, the regime crisis intensified andthe problems challenging the new government became graver, the HDP’s opportunities increased. This is exactly why the pessimism after November 1 is unwarranted. On the contrary, there are enormous opportunities for those who wish to use the existence of HDP’s MPs in the parliament as leverage, and to bring it together with the mass movement. Except for the opportunities of June 7, the opportunities offered in this period are enormous in comparison to earlier periods.

Those who wish to make use of these opportunities should set to work immediately by calling those responsible to account for the election frauds. It is not enough just to object to the election results, but also to call to account the massacres during the campaign period, foremost of all in Ankara, Suruç, and Diyarbakır. Similarly, all the irregularities of the President since the parliamentary holiday should be brought up and the parliamentary mechanisms should be set into motion in order to call him to account for these irregularities. Simultaneously, action should be taken for organizing mass protests. In order to pave the way for the dissipation of the clouds of fear, the public meetings of MPs are more urgent than ever.

For those who choose this line of action, the statement of Demirtaş and Yüksedağ on the election night, as they were respectful of the election results, is the example of an attitude that is tripping on its own feet. Similarly, those who want to build an opponent block of labourers should leave the discourse of “we will be better prepared for the 2019 elections”, which was part of the same speech. A real intention of building the opponent block of the labourers and the oppressed does not postpone the battle against the tyrant Erdoğan and his AKP to the next elections. What needs to be done is to take action immediately in order to get rid of both.

After all, even before calling to account for the election frauds and massacres during the campaign process, the statements of HDP and DTK that they were ready for a dialogue with AKP in return for efforts for a new constitution, and Ayhan Bilgen’s subsequent outburst that the “Presidential system can also be discussed”, demonstrate an attitude that prevents a mass struggle and disseminates fantasies in favour of the tyrannical AKP. In the upcoming period, it is possible to move forward only if AKP and Erdoğan, Roboski, the semi-trucks sent by the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) to ISIS are not forgotten and are put into target. Otherwise, it won’t be possible to make use of any of the opportunities of the regime crisis.

As a matter of fact, the roots of the wrong attitudes that became salient right after the elections can be traced back to the period prior to June 7.

Those who cannot see the fallacies since June 7 can neither diagnose AKP’s deadlock

The nonsensical discourse that the people’s will has been demonstrating itself, and will continue to do so through the ballot box was put aside first on June 8 by some of its most vigorous advocates. By claiming that the results from the ballot boxes in the June 7 elections did not represent the people’s will, Erdoğan and his supporters declared it null and void and cooked up a new election plan.

Even though it was called re-election, what was happening was a change of the election results through intervention in the ballot box from outside the ballot box. Hence, the coalition option that came out of the ballot box was prevented with the interventions of the palace, and a coercive re-election plan was cooked up. Basically, this move by itself was nothing but AKP’s denial of the election results and its declaration of forthcoming November 1 elections that would be enabled via outside intervention in the elections.

However, the opposition led by CHP and dragged on CHP’s tail in the parliamentary context, HDP, did not take the necessary steps to  spoil this game.

CHP started an opposition against Erdoğan by calling him to “act within the framework of the constitution”, whereas Erdoğan was using all the advantages provided to him by the September 12 Constitution in order to build his dictatorship. In other words, CHP relied on the paradox of using the September 12 Constitution as a weapon against the one who is the top executor of the September 12 regime. The HDP was dragged along this tendency, too.

The crucial consequences of this attitude demonstrated themselves in the November 1 elections. Discardingthe election results, Erdoğan and AKP were taking the country to a new election with moves that were known within the bourgeois opposition as a “palace coup”, while, despite their vague references to a coup, the opposition could not avoid the idiocy of acting as if it were a regular electoral process and went on repeating that the public will would show itself in the ballot box.

However, AKP and Erdoğan were aware of the fact that they could not accomplish their purpose by solely relying on the ballot box. Actually, this attitude was manifested not after June 7, but even before then. Thus, realizing that the elections wouldn’t yield their desired outcome, AKP started to intervene in the election results by organizing bomb attacks at HDP buildings and rallies before June 7, although with delay. In the second elections, they would pave the way for bigger and more effective attacks and inhibition attempts that were expected to compensate for this delay. In fact, following the bombing in Suruç, the regions where HDP was well ahead, foremost the cities and towns that declared autonomy, were subjected to attacks that were more cruel and extensive than ever. Curfews surpassing the September 12 period along with bombings and sniper assassinations followed everywhere. It should of course be expected that a government that bombed the Roboski villagers with F16s – and even punished their mules – because they had voted for the independent candidates despite being village guards, would not hesitate to inflict punishment and banishment on the towns that voted for HDP in such a rage. However, these incomparable attacks were confronted with an unforeseen resistance as had happened before in Sinjar and Kobane. The final straw was the bomb attack in Ankara. This was followed by Davutoğlu’s threat of  “if we go, white Toros cars will come back instead.”

During this entire period, CHP did not only fail to display a critical attitude against the attacks, but  also gave green light to the oppression measures. HDP could not act in accordance with its grassroots, resisting the attacks with trenches and barricades. Just like CHP or its parliamentarian mentors, HDP could not go beyond repeating that these will be accounted for at the ballot box and displayed a hindering attitude towards the active protests of the masses on the streets.

Even when KCK announced that they would stop their guerrilla actions in the election period marked by intense blood and gunpowder, HDP responded with peace and temperance messages rather than using this in order to pave the way for a mass movement.

Announced as the real loser of the November 1 elections, MHP pursued a supportive policy that facilitated AKP’s attack policies, just like it did in the speakership elections. Even though it seems that they were harmed most by the elections, MHP had a very supportive attitude towards AKP so that the latter would follow its suggestions. Reminiscent of the September 12 period when MHP leaders said “we are in jail but our ideas are in the government”, MHP was saying “the peace period must be chucked out” and AKP did; MHP was saying “Bomb Kandil and wipe it off the map” and AKP not only launched the most extensive air operations on Kandil, but also started air attacks on the YPG positions in Rojava under the guise of attacking ISIS.

Thereby, entering the elections with its claim “back to single-party, back to work”, AKP avoided being overthrown with the help of MHP, with the possibilities of TSK, its prior target, and with the excessively heavy armed units of the police, which has an unknown ratio of officers trained by the anti-Kurdish fellowship.

Frankly, one would be naïve to interpret this picture as if AKP came to power alone. AKP’s only gain as a result of these operations was to cover for a while the corruption files and support convoys for ISIS. It did not come to power alone, but it stayed in power thanks to the forces that until yesterday were declared as rivals and enemies, which were strengthened as a consequence. In this sense, the ones who could not avoid the idiocy of perceiving victory and defeat as the messages of ballot boxes are terribly wrong.

This is the picture that the November 1 elections portrayed. From this point of view, one should be able to see this: The former AKP that came to power by articulating “Kurdish opening”, “resolution”, “mothers’ tears should end”, “arms should be silenced”, “militarism should come to an end”, etc. is clearly not the same as today’s AKP that says and does the opposite of these. In place of the AKP that was inclined to struggle for democratic rights and to move towards power by backing up and absorbing Kurds, there is now an AKP that is compelled to seek support of its former rivals and enemies, so that it can oppress and terrorize the Kurds.

In this respect, it is not accurate to say that AKP gained a victory in the elections. AKP was the number one party at the ballot box, but this does not mean that it is in power alone and in absolute terms. While it is able to form a government alone, AKP has not achieved Tayyip Erdoğan’s essential purpose yet. It is still unable to make constitutional amendments by itself that would reinforce the September 12 regime. With the support of MHP, it has achieved majority in the parliament, but it could not succeed in toppling HDP under the threshold. It has burnt all the bridges with HDP that could have otherwise been asked for support and could not manage to cause a total rebuff for CHP. On the contrary, the support from MHP could only be achieved with MHP falling behind HDP. Now there will not be a parliamentary deputy speaker from MHP. AKP is obliged to a single choice to cut its losses in the parliament, which is to further weaken MHP.

Therefore, it is clear that AKP’s November 1 electoral victory is a Pyrrhic victory. Under these circumstances, instead of executing power based on parliamentary majority, AKP is forced to execute power with the Palace in the foreground and without any constitutional basis.

Against this AKP and the palace dictatorship, an opposition restricted to the parliamentary grounds and to the framework of the September 12 constitution will be the greatest support that AKP needs under these circumstances.

That’s why it is indispensable that the struggle against this dictatorship is primarily through the means of democratic mass movements outside the parliament. HDP having a strong group in the parliament is crucial for this cause. But, this parliamentary group will be effective only as long as it is encouraged by the mass movements on the streets, and as long as it can pave the way for these movements.

Therefore, while the circumstances are more conducive than ever to build the front of the labourers and the oppressed against AKP, stagnation in this direction should be charged up to the parliamentarian, legalistic, liquidationist line that is prevalent in the left, not to the outer forces. The primary task awaiting the revolutionists is to build a down-to-earth struggle against this line.

KöZ will continue its pre-June 7 stance after November 1, too

HDP is mainly the product of the latest wave of legalistic liquidationism that has spread in full force since the end of the 1980’s. It is not a coincidence that some major actors of the previous waves are also involved in this project. Nonetheless, HDP is also founded upon the strongest and most effective mass movement of the labourers and the oppressed in Turkey’s political history. It has the potential of playing a role that is many times greater than that of TİP (Workers Party of Turkey) in the 1960’s, and of TKP (Communist Party of Turkey) in the 1970’s as reformist parties. It is able to provide a ground like TİP, which involved revolutionists who would materialize the 71 breakthrough, while it also has the capacity to play a hindering role no less than TKP, which blocked the revolutionary movement and restricted the masses of labourers to a pacifist line. On the contrary, this defines the most convenient tactical approach for differentiation of revolutionists within or supporting HDP and meeting with them on the basis of this experience.

In this context, the attitude of KöZ to “support HDP despite HDP” finds meaning. HDP’s liquidationist character and its commitment to the legalistic parliamentarism is an obstacle for communists to act within and as parts of HDP. Yet, the attitude of supporting HDP against AKP does not actually mean supporting HDP or its stance. On the contrary, it refers to a tactical attitude that would enable the dissociation of the revolutionists among the elements that support HDP inside or outside, and to meet with them on the basis of the lessons of this experience.

In the upcoming period, the task of building the main opposition strengthened by mass mobilizations and paving the way for them is on HDP’s shoulders. The only obstacle in completing this task is its passive attitude, which was also a drawback in its election campaigns that almost left it under the threshold. As long as the necessary lessons are learned from the November 1 elections, a democratic opposition movement led by HDP would end AKP’s Pyrrhic victory and pave the way for a genuine democratic struggle.